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| John L. Hill |
However, appellate courts routinely defer to a trial judge’s findings of fact. Misinterpretation of evidence became a key issue in an appeal brought by Charles Sturgeon. The decision was released on Aug. 1, 2025 (R. v. Sturgeon, 2025 ONCA 572).
In February 2020, Nolan Darnell visited an apartment with an acquaintance, Ashley Burggraeve, expecting sexual services from her. Instead, three masked men assaulted and robbed him, stealing, among other items, his distinctive white Louis Vuitton sunglasses. Darnell recognized one of the assailants as Charles Sturgeon, a man he knew from
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Two days later, Sturgeon was arrested for impaired driving and was found with the stolen sunglasses. Darnell had already identified Sturgeon as one of the robbers in his police statement, expressing 90 per cent certainty based on facial recognition. Although he later confirmed this by viewing Sturgeon’s Facebook photo, the trial judge excluded that confirmation as improper.
Despite some concerns about initial uncertainty and the Facebook search, the trial judge found Darnell to be a credible and reliable witness. The judge noted that his recognition was reinforced by (1) Sturgeon’s possession of the stolen sunglasses two days after the robbery and (2) his subsequent association with Burggraeve, at the time of his arrest, who was involved in the crime. These facts independently supported Darnell’s identification, leading to Sturgeon’s conviction for robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, assault causing bodily harm, and disguise with intent.
On appeal, Sturgeon argued that the trial judge misunderstood the corroborative evidence. An Appeal Court will intervene only if the misapprehension of the evidence affects its core and not just minor details. Any misapprehension must also influence the judge’s reasoning, resulting in a verdict that would constitute a miscarriage of justice.
Sturgeon argued that there was no evidence he possessed the white Louis Vuitton sunglasses when he was first arrested. The arresting officers neither found the glasses nor explained why they were attributed to him. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, ruling that although there was no direct proof, it was reasonable for the trial judge to infer possession. Since the sunglasses were among the personal items collected from Sturgeon at the time of arrest, consistent with standard police practice for handling detainees’ belongings, it was within the judge’s discretion to conclude that Sturgeon had the sunglasses in his possession when he was initially detained.
Yet there was a misapprehension of evidence. Sturgeon’s counsel contended that the trial judge wrongly relied on the idea that Burggraeve was a passenger in his vehicle at the time of his arrest, since there was no evidence of that in the record. The appellate court agreed.
The claim that Burggraeve was in the car arose only during defence counsel’s closing submissions, when counsel speculated that she, rather than Sturgeon, might have possessed the stolen sunglasses. However, no witness testimony or other evidence supported that claim.
Although the Crown argued that defence counsel’s statement could be treated as an informal admission, the court rejected that position, finding that counsel’s remark was not an admission of fact but a mistaken assertion about what evidence already existed. The trial judge relied on this wrong belief and therefore misapprehended the evidence by treating Burggraeve’s supposed presence in the car as corroboration of Darnell’s identification of Sturgeon.
However, if the court intervened, the main issue to resolve would be the misunderstanding of the evidence against Sturgeon. The appellate court examined whether the trial judge’s mistaken belief that Burggraeve was in Sturgeon’s vehicle at the time of his arrest affected the reliability of Darnell’s identification of the appellant.
The court highlighted the common risks of wrongful convictions resulting from mistaken eyewitness identifications. It examined the Tat factors ((1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.)) used to evaluate reliability, such as whether the witness knew the accused, the conditions during the observation, the credibility of pretrial identification, and whether there was independent corroboration.
Here, the trial judge exercised caution, acknowledging the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony and the limits of Darnell’s initial “90 per cent certainty.” However, Darnell’s confidence was stronger because he personally knew Sturgeon from previous interactions and identified him without police prompting.
Even after dismissing the mistaken belief about Burggraeve’s presence in the car, the independent corroborative evidence — the appellant’s possession of the stolen Louis Vuitton sunglasses two days after the robbery — remained compelling. In fact, the court noted that if Burggraeve had not been present, the strength of the sunglasses as corroborative evidence would have been even greater, as it would have eliminated a possible innocent explanation for their presence.
There was no conflicting evidence undermining Darnell’s identification, and the Crown had not relied on Burggraeve’s supposed presence as a key corroborating fact. The misapprehension arose solely from the defence counsel’s mistaken statement, not from any procedural unfairness.
Drawing on R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, the court held that the misapprehension was not significantly connected to the verdict. The evidence of the appellant’s possession of the stolen sunglasses provided strong, independent confirmation of his identity as one of the robbers.
The appellate court acknowledged a minor misunderstanding but deemed it immaterial, as Sturgeon’s possession of the stolen sunglasses provided strong independent corroboration of his identity. The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld.
John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. His most recent book, Acts of Darkness (Durvile & UpRoute Books), was released July 1. Hill is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books) and The Rest of the (True Crime) Story (AOS Publishing). Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com.
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