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| John L. Hill |
Joyce Steinwand, also known as Gauthier, was charged, along with three others, after a 2021 traffic stop uncovered cocaine, more than $5,000 in cash, a loaded handgun and multiple cellphones, some hidden in the vehicle and others found on back-seat passengers. As the driver, Steinwand faced eight charges: possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, possession of proceeds of crime and six firearm-related offences under the Criminal Code. Only the drug trafficking charge carried a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment (i.e., 14 years or more), making it eligible for a preliminary inquiry under the 2019 amendments.
At the preliminary inquiry, two back-seat passengers consented to committal. Steinwand and the front-seat passenger sought discharge on all counts. The judge found sufficient evidence to commit Steinwand to trial on the drug trafficking charge, citing her prior drug involvement, links to cellphones found in the vehicle, her role as driver and evidence that traffickers often use trusted third-party drivers. However, he found insufficient evidence to commit her on the money and firearm charges.
The key issue was whether the preliminary inquiry judge had jurisdiction to discharge Steinwand on the non-qualifying charges (those carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years). The Crown argued that, following the 2019 amendments limiting preliminary inquiries to indictable offences punishable by 14 years or more, the judge lacked authority to rule on other charges. The preliminary inquiry judge disagreed, reasoning that because the lesser charges were closely related to the main drug offence, it would be inefficient and contrary to Parliament’s intent to send them to trial when the committal threshold was not met. He discharged Steinwand on those counts.
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Steinwand appealed, but before the matter proceeded further, the Crown advised that it would not file an indictment and would not continue the prosecution. Despite becoming moot, the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal delivered its decision on Dec. 8, 2025 (R. v. Steinwand, 2025 NWTCA 8).
The court considered two interpretations of ss. 535 and 548 of the Criminal Code regarding a preliminary inquiry judge’s jurisdiction. The first (advanced by Steinwand) held that once a preliminary inquiry is properly triggered by a qualifying offence (punishable by 14 years or more), the judge may scrutinize any other indictable offence in respect of the same transaction, including charged offences carrying penalties of less than 14 years. The second (advanced by the Crown) limited the judge’s authority to the qualifying charge, included offences, and uncharged indictable offences arising from the same transaction.
The court adopted the first interpretation, with qualifications. It rejected the argument that s. 536(4)’s reference to “the charge” limits jurisdiction to only the qualifying offence. Section 536(4) governs when an inquiry must be held; s. 535 defines its scope. Together, they require the judge to hold an inquiry into the qualifying offence and permit consideration of “any other indictable offence.” Reading the provisions as restricting jurisdiction only to 14-year offences would improperly nullify Parliament’s use of the broader phrase “any other indictable offence,” which appears in both ss. 535 and 548, and was retained even after the 2019 amendments.
Reviewing the legislative history, the court noted that amendments following R. v. Chabot, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 985 expanded the authority of preliminary inquiry judges to commit an accused for uncharged indictable offences arising from the same transaction. Historically, this meant an accused could leave a preliminary inquiry facing more charges than at the outset. Transplanting that understanding into the post-2019 regime, where preliminary inquiries are limited to the most serious offences, would produce an inequitable result if judges could add uncharged offences but not dismiss related charged ones. The court found no indication Parliament intended such asymmetry.
The court concluded that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction to examine any other indictable offence, charged or uncharged, provided that it arises from the same transaction and is founded on facts disclosed by the evidence led in relation to the qualifying offence.
This interpretation respects the statutory wording while upholding Parliament’s goal of efficiency. Judges may consider only related offences where the evidence required to assess them is already encompassed within the evidence relevant to the 14-year “threshold” charge. No additional witnesses or expanded proceedings should be required. If the related charges fail the committal test on that existing record, the judge may discharge them.
Applying this approach, the court held that the drug trafficking charge (which triggered the inquiry) and the related weapons offences (carrying less than 14 years) arose from the same transaction and were based on substantially the same evidence because the evidence for the drug charge subsumed that for the weapons charges. The preliminary inquiry judge, therefore, had jurisdiction to determine whether the related charges met the committal test.
Although the appeal was ultimately moot, the court issued these reasons to clarify how ss. 535 and 548 govern a preliminary inquiry judge’s jurisdiction.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Suzanne Duncan would have dismissed the appeal, concluding that a preliminary inquiry judge lacks jurisdiction to inquire into, commit or discharge charges punishable by less than 14 years’ imprisonment, unless they are included or uncharged offences revealed by the evidence on the 14-year “triggering” charge. She noted that the Criminal Code restricts preliminary inquiries to indictable offences punishable by 14 years or more. Parliament amended the Code to reduce court delays, streamline proceedings and lessen the burden on witnesses, especially vulnerable ones who might otherwise have to testify twice. Parliament replaced “charge” with “offence” to allow judges to commit on included or uncharged offences arising from the same transaction.
Justice Duncan concluded that this wording was never intended to authorize scrutiny of offences separately charged that carry a sentence of less than 14 years. The 2019 amendments did not alter that meaning. Justice Duncan emphasized that the Crown has a duty to discontinue prosecutions lacking a reasonable prospect of conviction, and judicial pretrial processes can reinforce that duty. If weak charges persist, the accused may seek a directed verdict at trial. These remedies, she said, adequately protect accused persons without expanding the jurisdiction of the preliminary inquiry. In her view, the majority’s interpretation risks expanding preliminary inquiries contrary to Parliament’s intent. A preliminary inquiry judge may address included or uncharged related offences revealed by the evidence on the qualifying 14-year charge but has no authority to commit or discharge separate charged offences punishable by less than 14 years.
John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. He is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books) and The Rest of the (True Crime) Story (AOS Publishing). Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com.
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