Law360 Canada (June 4, 2026, 2:38 PM EDT) --

John L. Hill

What does it take to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

The case against Navado Roy Wood was built on a simple proposition: a masked Calgary bank robber could be identified even though no one ever saw his face. Who was that masked man? There were no eyewitness identifications, no confession and no forensic evidence placing him inside the bank.

Instead, the Crown relied on a web of circumstantial evidence, including a taxi booking, cellphone records, surveillance videos and the observations of a cousin to persuade a judge beyond a reasonable doubt that Wood was the man behind the mask.

The trial judge found the Crown’s evidence sufficient. Navado Roy Wood was the man who committed the April 1, 2020, bank robbery. He was convicted. Wood was sentenced to four years for wearing a mask when he ordered a taxi that drove him to a Bank of Montreal in northeast Calgary, which he was accused of robbing, before returning to his ride. He then appealed his convictions for robbery and for disguising his face with intent to commit an indictable offence.

Instead of challenging the identification issue, his appeal was based on blaming his lawyer for the disappointing result. He argued that his trial was unfair because he was improperly excluded from parts of the proceedings, received ineffective assistance of counsel and was convicted on inadmissible evidence. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions (R. v. Wood, 2026 ABCA 180).

The robbery was committed by a masked individual who took a taxi to a bank, handed a teller a threatening note demanding money, obtained $500 and then returned by taxi. Because the robber’s face was concealed, a not-unusual situation at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the central issue at trial was the robber’s identity. The Crown relied on taxi and bank surveillance recordings, cellphone records and identification evidence from Wood’s cousin.

The evidence showed that calls from Wood’s phone were used to arrange the taxi ride linked to the robbery. Wood’s cousin testified that he recognized the robber’s clothing, gloves, voice and handwriting as belonging to his relative. The trial judge ultimately found that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence was that Wood committed the robbery.

Woods argued that his trial was unfair, first because he was excluded from the courtroom. He was briefly excluded on two occasions while legal objections were discussed. Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code provides that an accused has the right to be present for the entirety of the trial. An accused is entitled to “direct knowledge of anything that transpires in the course of his trial which could involve his vital interests.” R. v. Hertrich, 137 DLR (3d) 400, cited in Vézina and Côté v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 2 (SCC); R. v. Peterson, 2025 ABCA 134. Improperly excluding an accused is an error of law, giving rise to a presumption of prejudice under s. 686(1)(a)(ii) (R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16; R. v. D.Q., 2021 ONCA 827; R. v. Barrow, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 694 (SCC)).

The Appeal Court agreed that the exclusions were technical errors because an accused generally has the right to be present throughout the trial. However, the court found that neither exclusion caused any prejudice. The first exclusion concerned a discussion about whether the defence was raising an alibi. The second exclusion lasted only moments and was initiated by defence counsel before the judge immediately recalled Wood. Because the discussions were brief and procedural and had no effect on the defence strategy or evidence, the Appeal Court concluded that the error did not affect trial fairness.

The more substantial ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel. Wood alleged that his lawyer was ineffective for reinforcing Crown evidence during cross-examination and for failing to object to inadmissible evidence. Wood also accused his lawyer of conducting the trial incompetently in several respects.

The court admitted an affidavit from trial counsel explaining his decisions and held that Wood failed to overcome the strong presumption of counsel’s competence. Many of the complained-of actions were strategic decisions, including not challenging the police’s influence on the cousin’s identification, not testing the handwriting evidence, and suggesting that someone else had used the appellant’s phone.

There is a strong presumption of counsel’s competence, and conduct is reviewed under a reasonableness standard without the benefit of hindsight (R. v. G.D.B., 2000 SCC 22). The court emphasized that appellate courts do not second-guess reasonable trial strategy with hindsight. It found that none of the alleged deficiencies fell below professional standards and, more importantly, that none caused prejudice. The trial judge’s verdict was based primarily on properly admitted evidence, including surveillance recordings, phone records and the cousin’s testimony.

As Wood’s last ground for appeal, he argued that inadmissible evidence improperly influenced the verdict. In particular, he was critical that a photocopy of the robbery note, rather than the original, had been admitted as evidence. He also challenged certain opinion evidence from the detective about the sequence of calls to arrange a taxi, and evidence concerning a 911 call Wood made on another occasion that was used to link Wood’s phone number with the number used to arrange the robbery.

The court rejected these arguments. It held that the robbery note’s authenticity was never disputed and played only a minor role. The detective’s comments about the phone-call sequence merely explained the investigation and were not relied on by the trial judge. Any hearsay concerns about the 911 call were cured because Woods admitted making the call and the recording was played at trial.

The court found that the brief courtroom exclusions caused no prejudice. Trial counsel’s representation was competent and did not result in a miscarriage of justice. No inadmissible evidence materially affected the verdict.

Because the trial judge’s finding of guilt was supported by strong circumstantial evidence and reasonable factual conclusions, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.
 
John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. He is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books) and The Rest of the (True Crime) Story (AOS Publishing). His most recent book, Acts of Darkness, (Durvile & UpRoute) was shortlisted as one of five nominees for the Crime Writers of Canada’s Brass Knuckles Award for Best Nonfiction Crime Book. Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com. 

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