DEFAMATION - Who can be defamed - Corporations - Defamatory statements - Defences - Qualified privilege

Law360 Canada (April 6, 2023, 3:46 PM EDT) -- Appeal by The Corporation of the Township of Clearview (Appellant), from the dismissal of its motion to dismiss a defamation action and breach of fiduciary duty claim brought by Laurie Thatcher-Craig, John Craig and Clearview Valley Farms Inc. (Respondents). The respondents operated a hops farm within the Township. They wanted to expand their operation with an on-site micro-brewery and a small retail space. Despite the requirement of seeking a zoning by-law amendment to permit a brewery on their property, the respondents took the position that a brewery was already a permitted use and therefore only a site plan application was required. Instead of processing the application, the appellant’s planning department began to prepare a report to Township Council that a brewery was not a permitted use. The report concluded that a brewery was not a permitted use. An article about the proposed brewery was published in a local newspaper, as well as in other newspapers, following which the appellant received letters from the public commenting about the proposal. The appellant posted the site plan application to its online application database, along with its report to council. It posted the letters to the online database as received with no attempt to edit them. The respondents believed that the publication of the letters caused a drop-off in their customer contract renewals. They commenced an action, but the statement of claim did not identify the defamatory words complained of specifically. In response to a demand for particulars, the respondents stated that they were within the appellant’s knowledge and part of the public record, and that the whole of the public comments were defamatory, inaccurate and damaging. The appellant moved for an order dismissing the action under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) provision. The motion was dismissed. The motion judge concluded that either qualified privilege did not arise or exceeded its scope. He inferred from the record that the respondents suffered substantial monetary harm in the form of lost sales from the publication of the comments on the appellant’s website. He concluded that the defamation and the negligence claims both arose from the posted comments. The breach of fiduciary duty claim did not and therefore could not be dismissed. The appellants submitted that the motion judge made two errors in his treatment of the statement of claim and raised the defences of qualified privilege and indemnity....

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