Law360 Canada (May 12, 2026, 10:34 AM EDT) --

John L. Hill

The choice in the expression “Fear has two meanings: Forget everything and run, or face everything and rise” could underpin two different approaches taken by the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal in assessing a dangerous driving charge resulting in a death.

In R. v. Lafferty, 2025 NWTSC 25, the trial judge convicted Hannah Lafferty of dangerous driving causing death, finding that her conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The case arose from an incident on April 21, 2022. Hannah Lafferty accelerated her father’s Ford F-150 with the driver’s door open while Ikeda Lafferty stood on the running board, holding the interior door handle. Witnesses described the truck fishtailing and swerving rapidly through the residential area. Germaine Mantla, standing off the roadway, was struck by the open driver’s door and killed.

The court held that the actus reus of dangerous driving was clearly established. The driving occurred in a residential parking area where pedestrians could reasonably be expected to be present. The road surface was icy and gravel-covered; there were no sidewalks. Witnesses described the truck as accelerating aggressively, fishtailing and travelling on the wrong side of the road. The judge concluded that this manner of driving objectively endangered the public.

Regarding mens rea, the court applied the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26. The judge found that a reasonable person would have foreseen the obvious risks posed by accelerating, swerving and attempting to shake a person from the side of the vehicle while failing to look ahead. Lafferty admitted she deliberately drove “like a snake” to dislodge Ikeda from the truck.

The defence argued that Lafferty acted in self-defence and necessity because she feared a confrontation with Ikeda, her boyfriend Austin Moore’s former partner. The judge rejected both defences. Although Lafferty genuinely feared Ikeda, the court found her fear objectively unreasonable. Ikeda had no weapon, made no threats and merely approached the truck to speak with her. The court held that a reasonable person would have anticipated only a verbal confrontation, not violence.

The judge further ruled that Lafferty’s response was grossly disproportionate. Rather than using safer alternatives, such as leaving the truck, calling for Moore or contacting the police, she operated the truck recklessly in a populated residential area. The court emphasized that her conduct was deliberate, not a momentary lapse of attention or simple carelessness. By accelerating, swerving, looking away from the roadway and driving with a person hanging from the open door, Lafferty created an immediate and foreseeable risk of catastrophic harm.

The court ultimately concluded that Lafferty’s actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver and found her guilty of dangerous driving that caused the death of Germaine Mantla.

In the appeal decision in R. v. Lafferty, 2026 NWTCA 3, the majority dismissed Lafferty’s appeal and upheld her conviction for dangerous driving causing death. At the same time, a third panel member, Justice Mark Mossey, dissented and would have ordered a new trial due to errors in the trial judge’s treatment of self-defence.

The majority held that the trial judge correctly applied the law governing dangerous driving. Relying on Beatty and Roy, the court emphasized that dangerous driving can be proved either under the modified objective standard or by proof of intentionally dangerous conduct. The majority found that Lafferty’s deliberate decision to accelerate and swerve to throw Ikeda from the truck easily satisfied the mens rea requirement. Her conduct intentionally created a danger to others, consistent with the reasoning in R. v. Griffith, 2019 BCCA 37.

The majority also upheld the trial judge’s rejection of self-defence. Although the trial judge accepted that Lafferty genuinely believed Ikeda intended to harm her, the court found it was open to the judge to conclude that belief was not objectively reasonable. The evidence showed the women had little prior interaction, Ikeda carried no weapon, made no threats and there was no conversation before the incident. The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that the trial judge improperly narrowed the meaning of “force” under s. 34 of the Criminal Code. According to the majority, the relevant question was the actual threat perceived by Lafferty, namely that Ikeda wanted to hurt her physically, and the trial judge properly analyzed that belief.

The majority further held that the trial judge correctly found Lafferty’s response disproportionate. The focus remained on the dangerous manner of driving, not merely on the tragic result. The court concluded that the trial judge reasonably found that safer alternatives existed, including leaving the vehicle, calling Austin Moore or contacting the police. The majority also rejected arguments that the trial judge failed to consider Lafferty’s shoulder injury or other factors under s. 34(2). Although the injury was not discussed in detail, the majority held that the judge was clearly aware of it and was entitled to conclude that it did not materially alter the analysis.

Finally, the majority dismissed arguments that the trial judge failed to apply the test from R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 on credibility and reasonable doubt. The court found that this was not fundamentally a credibility contest because the trial judge accepted much of Lafferty’s evidence, including her explanation for why she drove as she did.

Justice Mossey dissented. He agreed that Lafferty’s driving established the mens rea for dangerous driving but concluded that the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors in rejecting self-defence.

The dissent adopted a much broader view of “force” under s. 34(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, relying heavily on R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37. Justice Mossey emphasized that self-defence under the modern Criminal Code is no longer limited to assaults or threats of bodily harm. In his view, Ikeda’s conduct, including angrily approaching the truck, opening the door, stepping onto the running board and attempting to remove the ignition key to force a confrontation constituted force or a threat of force. He concluded that the trial judge erred by focusing too narrowly on whether Lafferty reasonably feared bodily harm, rather than on whether she reasonably perceived any coercive force being used against her.

The dissent also criticized the trial judge’s characterization of Lafferty as “overly fearful.” Justice Mossey held that an ordinary person in Lafferty’s position could reasonably become frightened when unexpectedly confronted in a vehicle by an angry person attempting to take control of the ignition. He added that contemporary social norms would recognize such circumstances as threatening.

Justice Mossey further found error in the trial judge’s analysis of the proportionality of Lafferty’s response under s. 34(2). He concluded that the judge failed to properly consider a key statutory factor: Lafferty’s physical condition. Weeks before the incident, Lafferty had sustained a serious shoulder injury requiring surgery, including a metal plate and screws in her clavicle. According to the dissent, this injury was central to understanding why she believed she could not physically confront Ikeda and instead chose to flee. The dissent reasoned that the trial judge’s failure to meaningfully assess the injury’s effect on Lafferty’s physical capabilities amounted to a palpable and overriding error.

Justice Mossey would therefore have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial to ensure the issue of self-defence could be reconsidered properly.

John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. He is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books) and The Rest of the (True Crime) Story (AOS Publishing). His most recent book, Acts of Darkness, (Durvile & UpRoute) has been shortlisted as one of five nominees for the Crime Writers of Canada’s Brass Knuckles Award for Best Nonfiction Crime Book. Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com.

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