Law360 Canada (June 10, 2026, 11:49 AM EDT) --

Amissi Melchiade Manirabona

On April 27, 2026, the Government of Canada tabled legislation to enact a first ever federal law enforcement agency designed to investigate sophisticated financial crimes. Bill C-29, which proposes the establishment of a Canadian Financial Crimes Agency, represents an important step and an acknowledgment that Canada has long struggled with the investigation of complex financial crimes.

The proposed legislation follows a speech delivered on Oct. 20, 2025, by Canada’s Minister of Finance and National Revenue François-Philippe Champagne in which several major commitments were announced to strengthen the protection of citizens against fraud and financial crimes. In an international context marked by uncertainty and growing threats to economic security and citizens’ wellbeing, the government is showing its commitment to managing internal factors under its control.

While no state is allowed to take legal actions in other states, Canada’s strengthening of its own institutional, economic and security framework can serve as emulation and foster changes elsewhere. However, despite its stated ambitions, Bill C-29 suffers from some shortcomings that risk undermining the effectiveness of the proposed agency from the outset. This comment will mainly focus on three of those weaknesses.

One of the most significant concerns is that the proposed agency is only endowed with police power without any prosecutorial authority. The bill doesn’t provide the newly created agency with the capacity to initiate and conduct prosecutions following investigations. The bill’s s. 7 says that “the mandate of the Agency is to investigate financial crimes and contribute to the recovery of proceeds of crime.”

This contrasts with the approach adopted by the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which combines both investigative and prosecutorial powers. The integrated structure of the U.K.’s SFO has often been regarded as one of its main strengths because it allows investigators and prosecutors to work together from the beginning of complex financial crime cases. Such coordination and cooperation reduce institutional fragmentation while enhancing efficiency by ensuring the evidentiary coherence and reliability.

If Bill C-29 remains in its current state, investigations made by the new agency will be dependent on discretion from external and general prosecutors who may not be specialized in financial crimes-related practice. This separation risks reproducing the same institutional inefficiencies and weakness that have historically humped Canada’s effective response to white-collar crimes. Complex financial investigations require rapid prosecutorial guidance on evidentiary standards, disclosure obligations, international cooperation requests, plea negotiations and asset forfeiture strategies. Without embedded prosecutorial power, the proposed agency may easily become another investigative body in an already fragmented enforcement landscape.

A second major weakness is Bill C-29’s lack of precision regarding the exact offences that would fall within the jurisdiction of the agency. The legislation does not clearly enumerate the financial crimes over which the agency would exercise its authority. Bill C-29 seems to focus on laundering proceeds of crime. But that’s not the only financial crime Canada faces. While the Government of Canada highlighted “the rapid evolution of fraud techniques — anonymous messages, malicious links, automated calls mimicking human voices and fraudulent emails impersonating reputable banking institutions — which make scams not only harder to detect but also more invasive in citizens’ daily lives,” a precise list of financial crimes would help avoid misunderstandings on the part of law enforcers. A lack of legislative precision can also be misleading to law enforcement agents.

This legislative ambiguity risks producing uncertainty on the scope of the agency’s mandate and raises concerns about jurisdictional overlap with existing police units, securities regulators and anti-corruption agencies. It’s well-known that a specialized agency can only function effectively if its subject-matter jurisdiction is clearly defined. Otherwise, duplication of mandates, interagency conflicts and operational confusion are likely to emerge. Law enforcement officers need to focus their attention on investigations, not on determining whether a particular offence falls under their investigative powers.

This omission is difficult to justify given that there already exists an interesting example with the remediation agreement regime in Schedule to Part XXII.1 of the Criminal Code. The schedule identifies a series of offences eligible for remediation agreements (deferred prosecution agreements), including fraud, bribery, corruption, secret commissions, falsification of books and documents, and so on. The government could easily rely on this existing legislative framework to clearly outline the jurisdiction of the proposed agency. Using that list as a starting point would enhance legal certainty, ensure coherence within Canada’s criminal justice system, and reduce ambiguity regarding the agency’s mandate. It’s important that the bill explicitly specifies whether the agency will have authority over offences such as large-scale fraud, foreign corruption, sanctions violations, terrorist financing, tax evasion schemes, securities manipulation, cyber or AI-enabled financial crimes, as well as some other transnational crimes. Without such clarity, the agency’s mandate may become vulnerable to inconsistent interpretation and political or administrative discretion.

A third notable shortcoming is the bill’s silence regarding the treatment and the support for victims and witnesses involved in financial crime proceedings. Unlike the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office, which has the power to develop best practices and guidance highlighting the importance of witness cooperation, victim engagement and procedural support in complex financial cases, Bill C-29 does not clearly articulate how victims and witnesses will be protected, informed or assisted throughout investigations. Yet, financial crimes often cause devastating consequences for victims, including severe loss, reputational harm, psychological distress and prolonged trauma and uncertainty. In some cases, the psychological consequences may lead to physical ones such as suicide. Moreover, witnesses in complex financial investigations may face intimidation, threats and professional retaliation, or significant procedural burdens.

The absence of explicit statutory provisions addressing witness and victim rights to protection, information, participation, reparation and support risks maintaining a law enforcement model that prioritizes institutional structure success over the human cost of financial crimes. This omission is hardly understandable 11 years after the enactment of the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, a quasi-constitutional law aimed at enhancing victims’ and witnesses’ experiences within the criminal law process. Again, relying on the remediation agreement legal framework on victims’ rights would help improve the bill provisions. A legislative provision is always better than a single political statement.

In conclusion, while Bill C-29 constitutes a good step toward strengthening Canada’s fight against financial crimes, the proposed legal framework is still incomplete. A financial agency without prosecutorial authority, without a clearly defined jurisdiction, and without express consideration for the needs and expectations of victims and witnesses risks turning itself into an institution with symbolic value rather than one designed to ensure its effectiveness. With all those shortcomings and many others, the proposed agency risks not functioning as expected, just like the Corporate Criminal Liability and Remediation Agreements regimes, which, so far, have failed to bring meaningful changes.

If Parliament genuinely seeks to establish a world-class financial crimes enforcement agency comparable to the U.K.’s SFO, it should amend Bill C-29 to integrate prosecutorial powers, a clearly defined statutory mandate over a list of financial offences, as well as comprehensive protections and support mechanisms for victims and witnesses affected by financial crimes.

Amissi Melchiade Manirabona is a full professor at the Université de Montréal’s faculty of law. He specializes in white-collar crimes as well as in crime victims’ rights. He is co-director of the Justice centre for victims of crimes (CJVAC.ca) and a regular researcher at the International Centre for Comparative Criminology, the Centre de droit des affaires et du commerce international and the Centre d'études en droit économique (Université Laval).

The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s firm, its clients, Law360 Canada, LexisNexis Canada or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

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