Law360 Canada (October 1, 2026, 11:46 AM EDT) --
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| John L. Hill |
A recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision warns about the risks of delivering a bare criminal verdict and leaving the reasons for judgment for many months. In
R. v. Qita, 2026 ONCA 554, the court ordered a new trial after concluding that the extraordinary delay between the announcement of guilty verdicts and the delivery of written reasons rebutted the presumption that the reasons accurately reflected the trial judge’s actual reasoning.
The case involved immigration consultant Wissam (a.k.a. Sam) Qita and 7891296 Canada Inc., who were charged with 14 offences under the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). The charges stemmed from nine Syrian refugee sponsorship applications under the Private Sponsorship of Refugees program.
Olena Zagoruyko
Qita was found guilty of seven counts of misrepresentation and three counts of counseling misrepresentation. The corporation was convicted of two counts of misrepresentation. Qita received a three-and-a-half-year prison sentence, while the corporation was fined $20,000.
The underlying allegations were serious. Qita ran an immigration consulting business and used his corporation to sponsor clients. The Crown alleged that applicants prepaid settlement funds that the sponsor was supposed to hold, that the corporation told immigration authorities it held $150,000 in trust when those funds had already been withdrawn, and that some applicants were advised to tell immigration officials they had not paid Qita consulting fees.
The appeal, however, did not turn on whether those allegations had been proven. It concerned the trial judge’s delay in explaining why she found Qita guilty.
The Ontario Superior Court trial began in September 2020 and ultimately took 25 non-consecutive days. Closing submissions were completed on Sept. 22, 2021. Judgment was initially scheduled for Nov. 29, but Justice Suranganie Kumaranayake advised that she needed more time. The matter was adjourned several times.
On March 11, 2022, almost six months after closing submissions, the judge announced guilty verdicts on 10 of the 14 counts. She gave no written reasons and offered only a brief oral explanation that she had considered the extensive documentary and testimonial evidence and counsel’s submissions. She indicated that detailed reasons would follow. Those reasons did not arrive for another nine months and nine days.
During that period, the parties repeatedly asked when the reasons would be available. The judge initially suggested they would be ready within two or three weeks. Later, the judge cited difficulties with computer use and another criminal trial that took longer than anticipated. On Nov. 1, 2022, the judge apologized for the delay and promised the reasons would be completed by Nov. 14. They were ultimately released on Dec. 19, 2022.
The Court of Appeal’s concern stemmed from the principle set out in
R. v. Teskey, 2007 SCC 25. A strong presumption exists that a trial judge’s reasons reflect the actual reasoning that led to the verdict, rather than an after-the-fact justification for a result already chosen.
That presumption is linked to the equally important presumption of judicial impartiality recognized in cases including
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, and
R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484. The court emphasized that delay by itself does not rebut the presumption. Rather, an appellate court must examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of an informed and reasonable observer.
Teskey identified several circumstances relevant to that assessment. These include difficulty reaching the verdict, a bare declaration of guilt, indications that the judge remained open to reconsidering the result, the nature and complexity of the evidence, failures to respond to requests for reasons, indications that the reasons were prepared after the decision, and an inordinate delay without an adequate explanation.
The Court of Appeal found that five of the seven
Teskey factors were present in Qita’s case.
The trial was factually complex, but the judge described her deliberations as daunting and, at times, overwhelming. The court did not criticize her for finding the case difficult. Nevertheless, the difficulty in reaching a verdict was relevant to the analysis.
More importantly,
Teskey described the March 11 verdicts as a “bare declaration of guilt.” The Crown argued that the judge’s earlier, detailed reasons dismissing the defence motion for a directed verdict provided the necessary context. The court rejected that argument.
A directed-verdict ruling asks whether evidence exists on which a properly instructed trier of fact could find the accused guilty. It does not determine whether guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt after all of the evidence, including the defence evidence, has been considered. The court relied on
R. v. Charemski, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 679,
R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77 and other authorities in explaining that distinction.
The court also considered the more recent decision in
R. v. Khawaja, 2026 ONCA 304. There, the court confirmed that a lengthy delay does not, by itself, rebut the presumption of integrity. However, the longer the period between the verdict and the reasons, the greater the concern that the necessary connection between the two may not exist.
R. v. Artis, 2021 ONCA 862, and
R. v. Cunningham, 2011 ONCA 543, were also cited.
One feature of
Qita was particularly important. In addressing the defence’s subsequent s. 11(b) Charter application, the trial judge characterized the nine months between her verdict and the written reasons as part of her deliberation time. The Court of Appeal found that characterization significant.
The Supreme Court’s decision in
R. v. K.G.K., 2020 SCC 7 distinguishes deliberating toward a verdict from preparing reasons explaining a verdict already reached. As the Court of Appeal observed, once a verdict has been rendered, reasons explain how the decision was reached; they should not reflect ongoing deliberation about what the decision should be.
There was also evidence that approximately 75 per cent of the trial judge’s lengthy final reasons were identical or nearly identical to her earlier directed-verdict reasons. The court did not regard this as criticism of the judge’s work. However, it found the comparison significant because much of the reasoning apparently already existed, while the delay continued as the judge dealt with issues raised by the defence evidence.
Taken together, the circumstances led the court to conclude that the high threshold established in
Teskey had been met. An informed and reasonable observer could apprehend that the written reasons represented an after-the-fact justification for the guilty verdicts rather than a contemporaneous explanation of reasoning that had produced them.
The consequence was fundamental. The court held that the trial judge’s written reasons could not be relied on in the appeal. Because the Crown accepted that the bare verdicts, standing alone, could not sustain the convictions, the court had to set them aside and order a new trial.
The decision should not be read as a finding of personal misconduct by the trial judge. The court expressly emphasized that it was not attacking her personal integrity and described her as a hard-working judge who appeared not to have had sufficient time to complete her reasons in a difficult case. Nevertheless, the court concluded that appellate intervention was required because the demanding
Teskey threshold had been met.
Qita therefore extends beyond the particular facts. Trial judges may, in appropriate circumstances, announce a verdict with reasons to follow.
Teskey expressly permits this practice. But the reasons must remain demonstrably connected to the reasoning that produced the verdict. The decision illustrates that judicial workload and a case’s complexity, while relevant, do not provide an unlimited licence to separate a criminal verdict from the reasons explaining it.
For accused persons, the principle is especially important. A conviction is not merely a declaration of guilt. The accused, the Crown, victims and the public are entitled to understand why the court reached that conclusion. As the court observed, the appearance of justice suffers when the explanation for a serious criminal decision arrives too late.
Qita reminds us that judicial reasons are not merely an administrative exercise performed after the important work is done. In a criminal trial, the reasons are essential to demonstrating that the verdict resulted from a fair, reasoned assessment of the evidence rather than a conclusion reached after the fact.
John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. He is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books). His most recent book, Acts of Darkness
(Durvile & UpRoute), was shortlisted as one of five nominees for the Crime Writers of Canada’s Brass Knuckles Award for Best Nonfiction Crime Book.
Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com.
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