Law360 Canada (September 3, 2026, 11:56 AM EDT) --

John L. Hill

A Jan. 13 issue of the Ottawa Citizen reported on the sentencing of Alam Buoc, who had been found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder. Superior Court Justice Robert Maranger described the crimes in exceptionally harsh terms, calling Buoc a “homicidal maniac” and “a monster.” He characterized the July 2017 killings as “cold-blooded and ruthless” and said the motive appeared to be trivial. It involved an alleged dispute over a bullet that Buoc believed one of his friends had taken. The sentence imposed was the same as if the crime had been first-degree murder: life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years. Buoc appealed, and the Ontario Court of Appeal delivered its reasons on July 6, 2026 (R. v. Buoc, 2026 ONCA 492).

The jury had convicted Buoc of two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from the shootings of three friends. Two men, Abdulrahman Al-Shammari and Dirie Olol, died. Talal Al-Shammari survived.

The appeal decision involving these three shootings in Ottawa provides a useful reminder of the considerable deference appellate courts give to trial judges and juries, particularly where alleged errors in jury instructions are considered in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appeal raised three issues concerning the convictions: whether the jury should have received a specific warning about eyewitness identification; whether the jury was properly instructed about Buoc’s conduct after the shootings; and whether statements made by the surviving victim shortly after being shot were properly admitted under the res gestae, or spontaneous utterance, exception to the hearsay rule. As a general rule, spontaneous utterances made during or in the aftermath of a shocking event are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule: R. v. Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260; R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40. This is because such statements are inherently reliable where the surprise and stress of the event remove the possibility of concoction or deception: R. v. Khan (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Ont. C.A.), aff’d [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531; Ratten v. The Queen, [1972] AC 378 (P.C.), at paras. 389-90. In deciding whether to admit a spontaneous utterance for the truth of its contents, the court is not to look at the timing of the utterance, but at all of the circumstances at the time of the utterance, including the circumstances that diminish the possibility of concoction or distortion: R. v. Dakin (1995), 80 O.A.C. 253 (C.A.).

Buoc also argued that the 25-year parole-ineligibility period was unjustifiably harsh.

The Court of Appeal explained the significant deference owed to a sentencing judge and that only in the case of judicial error should an appellate court interfere (R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9), even if the Appeal Court would have decided differently (R. v. W.V., 2023 ONCA 655).

The identification issue is particularly instructive. Talal had known Buoc for approximately 15 years. The men had spent hours together before the shooting, first at a bar and later at Buoc’s home. The court accepted that eyewitness identification evidence is inherently dangerous and that juries generally should be warned about its frailties. It also recognized the potential problems created when police show a witness a single photograph rather than conducting a photo lineup.

But those principles did not require a warning in this case. The important distinction was between identifying a stranger and recognizing someone already well known to the witness. Talal was not attempting to identify an unknown assailant glimpsed briefly under difficult circumstances. He had known Buoc for 15 years and had been with him for several hours immediately before the shooting.

The court acknowledged that Talal’s consumption of alcohol and marijuana, his mental-health circumstances, the trauma of being shot and inconsistencies in his account raised legitimate questions about the reliability of his recollection. But the trial judge’s extensive instructions on the reliability of Talal’s evidence adequately addressed those concerns.

The decision therefore illustrates an important point for trial lawyers: a witness’s familiarity with the accused does not eliminate the need to consider identification evidence carefully, but it can materially change the nature of the identification problem.

The court also rejected the argument that the police had necessarily tainted the identification by showing Talal a single photograph. Given their longstanding relationship and the fact that Talal had been with Buoc immediately before the shooting, the usual concern that the photograph might implant the suspect’s face in the witness’s memory was not present to the same degree.

The second ground concerned Buoc’s efforts to leave Canada after the shootings. The evidence showed that he began making arrangements to travel to Sudan, including obtaining a passport photograph, applying for a passport on an expedited basis and purchasing a ticket to Khartoum. He was arrested before he could leave.

The legal significance is that post-offence conduct can be circumstantial evidence of guilt, but it must be handled cautiously. There is an obvious danger that jurors may reason backwards: if an accused behaved as though he were guilty, they may conclude that he must have been guilty.

The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that a jury must be cautioned to consider alternative explanations for post-offence conduct and must consider the evidence in the context of the case as a whole. Buoc argued that the trial judge’s charge was deficient because it did not expressly tell the jury that after-the-fact conduct was circumstantial evidence and that guilt could be inferred from it only if it was the only reasonable conclusion available.

The court agreed that the judge had not used that precise formulation. But that did not end the matter. The question on appeal was whether the charge as a whole adequately equipped the jury to decide the case. The trial judge had specifically directed the jurors to consider an alternative explanation for Buoc’s trip to Sudan; i.e., that he was travelling to attend a funeral. He also told them not to consider the post-offence conduct in isolation, but in light of all the evidence, and gave the jury the standard instruction concerning circumstantial evidence.

That was enough. This is perhaps the most useful broader lesson from the case. Appellate review of a jury charge is not a word-search exercise. The absence of a particular sentence or formula does not automatically constitute reversible error. The court examines the instructions as a whole and asks whether the jury was properly equipped to apply the law to the evidence.

The third ground involved two statements Talal made shortly after escaping from the shooting. While being taken to hospital, he said, in substance, that his friend had shot him. He made similar statements after arriving at the hospital.

The trial judge admitted the statements under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, finding that Talal was still under the stress and excitement of having been shot and that there was little realistic opportunity for fabrication.

The Court of Appeal found no error in that ruling. The issue is significant because hearsay exceptions depend upon the circumstances in which the statement was made. Here, the timing, the severity of Talal’s injuries and his evident state of shock supported the trial judge’s conclusion that the statements possessed the necessary threshold reliability.

The sentence appeal may be the most important aspect of the decision. A conviction for second-degree murder automatically carries a life sentence. The Criminal Code permits parole ineligibility ranging from 10 to 25 years. Buoc argued that imposing the maximum 25-year period was effectively treating his convictions as though they were first-degree murders.

The court rejected that argument. The murders were described at sentencing as cold-blooded, execution-style killings. The apparent motive was characterized as trivial, if not imaginary. Buoc was 30 years old and had a prior record involving illegal firearms. He attempted to leave Canada immediately after the shootings and demonstrated no remorse at sentencing.

Most importantly, the court held that the jury’s conviction of Buoc of second-degree rather than first-degree murder did not prevent the sentencing judge from imposing the maximum 25-year period of parole ineligibility.

The sentence was severe, but severity alone does not establish an error in principle. The appellate court emphasized the substantial deference owed to a sentencing judge. It will interfere only where the sentence is demonstrably unfit, or there has been an error in principle that affected the sentence.

The court also accepted the trial judge’s decision not to impose consecutive periods of parole ineligibility. Although the Crown had sought a much longer period, the trial judge concluded that the murders arose from the same transaction.

The Buoc appeal is not a case in which the Court of Appeal announced a dramatic new rule. Its importance is more practical.

For defence counsel, it demonstrates the difficulty of overturning a jury verdict based on alleged deficiencies in jury instructions when the instructions, read as a whole, adequately identify the relevant dangers. For prosecutors, it reinforces the evidentiary value of post-offence conduct. It also emphasizes the need for instructions that address innocent explanations. For trial judges, it also reminds them that substance matters more than formula in a jury charge.

The decision is also significant in sentencing. A 25-year period of parole ineligibility is the statutory maximum for second-degree murder, but the court made clear that it is not legally reserved for first-degree murder cases. In an exceptionally grave case, the maximum can be imposed even though the jury has deliberately chosen second-degree murder.

Buoc’s conduct was found to include two killings, a repeated effort to kill a third victim and an immediate attempt to escape Canada. The Court of Appeal concluded that, in those circumstances, the maximum period was neither an error in principle nor unduly harsh.

The final lesson may therefore be simple: an appellate court is not there to retry the case or substitute its preferred wording for that of the trial judge. Its task is to determine whether the trial was legally sound. In Buoc, despite significant questions about identification, post-offence conduct, hearsay and sentence, the court concluded that it was.

John L. Hill practised and taught prison law until his retirement. He holds a JD from Queen’s and an LLM in constitutional law from Osgoode Hall. He is also the author of Pine Box Parole: Terry Fitzsimmons and the Quest to End Solitary Confinement (Durvile & UpRoute Books) and The Rest of the (True Crime) Story (AOS Publishing). Contact him at johnlornehill@hotmail.com.

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